We present an optimization framework for solving multiagent convex programs subject to inequality constraints while keeping the agents' state trajectories private. Each agent has an objective function depending only upon its own state and the agents are collectively subject to global constraints. The agents do not directly communicate with each other but instead route messages through a trusted cloud computer. The cloud adds noise to data being sent to the agents in accordance with the framework of differential privacy and, thus, keeps each agent's state trajectory private from all other agents and any eavesdroppers. This private problem can be viewed as a stochastic variational inequality, and it is solved using a projection-based method for solving variational inequalities that resemble a noisy primal-dual gradient algorithm. Convergence of the optimization algorithm in the presence of noise is proven, and a quantifiable tradeoff between privacy and convergence is extracted from this proof. Simulation results are provided that demonstrate numerical convergence for both -differential privacy and ( , δ)-differential privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
O PTIMIZATION problems spreading across teams of agents arise naturally in several fields, including communications [1] , [2] ; robotics [3] ; machine learning [4] ; sensor networks [5] , [6] ; and smart power grids [7] - [9] . Correspondingly, a variety of approaches has been developed that solve problems with a wide variety of formulations. For example, [10] allows for distributed optimization of nondifferentiable objectives with time-varying communication links, [11] considers a similar problem formulation in which communication links fail over time, and [12] uses a distributed Newton method to solve dynamic network utility maximization problems. Many other problem types and solution schemes exist in the literature, and a broad exposition of results can be found in [13] .
In some cases, multiagent optimization is done using sensitive user data. A concrete example of such a case comes from smart power grids. In smart power grids, homeowners share their state values with others on the grid to allow for network management, for example, frequency regulation, and to minimize their own power costs. In some cases, the granular power usage data shared in smart grids can be used to infer sensitive details of users' personal lives [14] , [15] . In particular, smart-grid data can "provide a detailed breakdown of energy usage over a long period of time, which can show patterns of use," [15, p. 15, Item 16] . Furthermore, given these patterns, "[p]rofiles can thus be developed and then applied back to individual households and individual members of these households," [15, p. 15, Item 18] . These usage patterns in turn "could reveal personal details about the lives of consumers, such as their daily schedules," [14, p. 2, Paragraph 5] .
It is precisely the deduction of such patterns that we wish to prevent in the context of multiagent optimization. Based on the potentially revealing nature of some user data, we seek to optimize while protecting sensitive user data both from eavesdroppers and other agents in the network. In some sense, privacy and optimization are competing objectives in that agents who only seek to optimize may freely share their states with others in the network, while agents concerned only with privacy may be inclined to share no information at all. To privately optimize, then, we must strike a balance between these two different, competing objectives.
One approach to privacy that has recently seen widespread use is differential privacy. Differential privacy was originally established in the database literature, and it keeps sensitive database entries private when a database is queried by adding noise to the result of that query [16] . Dwork et al. [17] , [18] survey some of the important developments in this vein. Differential privacy has been adapted to dynamical systems in order to keep sensitive inputs private from an adversary observing a system's outputs [19] . A dynamical system is differentially private if inputs that are close in the input space produce outputs that have similar probability distributions; these notions will be made precise in Section III.
It is the dynamical systems notion of differential privacy that we apply to keep agents' state trajectories private while optimizing. One appealing aspect of differential privacy is its resilience to postprocessing, which allows for arbitrary processing of private information without the threat of its privacy guarantees being weakened [19, Th. 1] . Differential privacy is also robust to arbitrary side information, meaning that an adversary cannot weaken differential privacy by much through using information gleaned from another source [20] . The ability of differential privacy to mask sensitive information has been further studied using tools from probability, statistics, and information theory in [18] .
There has already been some work on enforcing differential privacy in optimization. In [21] , linear programs are solved in a framework that allows for keeping objective functions or constraints private. Han et al. [22] consider a similar setting wherein linearly constrained problems with affine objectives are solved while keeping the objective functions private. In the multiagent setting, [23] solves distributed consensus-type problems while keeping the agents' objective functions private, whereas [24] solves similar problems while keeping each agent's initial state private.
In this paper, we solve convex optimization problems in which each agent's state trajectory is sensitive information, and all agents wish to protect their exact state trajectories from other agents in the system and any eavesdroppers. To protect these sensitive data, a trusted cloud computer is used that performs certain computations upon information it receives from the agents, makes the results of those computations private by adding noise to them, and then sends the private results to each agent. Each agent then updates its state locally using the information it received from the cloud, and this process of sharing and updating information is repeated. This algorithm is online in the sense that agents' state trajectories are not first planned and then executed; instead, each agent determines subsequent state values in terms of its present state. The contribution of this paper, thus, consists of an online multiagent optimization algorithm that solves constrained optimization problems while keeping each agent's state trajectory differentially private. With this algorithm, we also provide probabilistic convergence rates and relate the level of privacy in the system to the convergence of the algorithm.
Our motivation for developing a mixed centralized/ decentralized algorithm is inspired by the prominence of cloud computing in many real-world applications. A survey of existing cloud applications is given in [25] , and that reference elaborates on the scalability of the cloud and its ability to coordinate many mobile devices. It is precisely these features of the cloud that make it an attractive choice here. In this paper, the cloud, viewed as a central aggregator [26] , is an integral part of the optimization process, and we leverage its scalability to aggregate all agents' information, perform computations upon that data in a private manner, and then distribute these private results to the agents.
The privacy implementation in this paper differs from the aforementioned references on private optimization in several key ways. In this paper, we are interested in solving problems in which the agents collectively run an online optimization algorithm by sharing private functions of sensitive information.
In the problems, we consider that each iteration of the optimization algorithm determines each agent's next state based on the agents' current states, as was done in, for example, [7] , [27] , and [28] for power systems. That is, in this paper, the iterates of the optimization algorithm are the agents' states themselves, and it is each agent's desire to keep its state trajectory private in order to protect information about its behavior. Therefore, while some other references on private optimization focus on privacy for other types of problem data, we focus specifically on keeping entire state trajectories private while optimizing, and we do so using the framework for trajectory-level privacy put forth in [19] . In addition, we incorporate both inequality constraints and set constraints, which are not in some other private optimization implementations.
Given the need to optimize while remaining private, encryption alone generally cannot provide the privacy guarantees that are needed in the problems we examine. In the "upstream" direction, encryption could be used to protect communications sent from the agents to the cloud, provided the cloud could decrypt them. However in the "downstream" direction, when the cloud sends transmissions to the agents, any encrypted messages from the cloud would generally need to be decrypted by the agents to allow each agent to update its state. While this strategy can protect transmissions of sensitive data from eavesdroppers, having the agents decrypt transmissions from the cloud would expose all agents' sensitive data to each other agent in the network, violating the privacy guarantees that are required. Instead, what is required here is a privacy implementation that protects user data from eavesdroppers and all others in the network, while still making that data useful for optimizing. It is for this reason that we use differential privacy.
This paper adds a proof of convergence, a convergence rate estimate, quantifies the privacy-convergence tradeoff, and provides new numerical results for two different privacy mechanisms. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the problem to be solved and its method of solution. Next, Section III covers the necessary elements of differential privacy and relates them to the setting of optimization. Then, Section IV provides a proof of convergence for the optimization algorithm used here and a bound on its convergence rate, in addition to exploring the tradeoff between privacy and convergence. Section V provides simulation results to support the theoretical developments made. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we define the problem to be solved. In Section II-A, we define a multiagent problem and then, to aid in the exposition of its solution method, formulate an equivalent ensemble problem. Then, the solution to that problem will be discussed and, in Section II-B, will be adapted to the cloud-based architecture used here. Throughout this section, the term "ensemble problem" refers to a centralized problem that is equivalent to the problem solved by the agents and cloud, which is not centralized. The ensemble problem and multiagent problem are equivalent (in that they lead to the same solution), though discussion will be carried out in terms of the ensemble problem for simplicity.
A. Problem Overview
Consider N agents indexed over the set I := {1, . . . , N}, with agent i having state x i ∈ R n i for some n i ∈ N. Agent i seeks to minimize the objective function f i : R n i → R, where f i depends only upon x i , that is, each agent's objective function has no dependence upon the other agents' states. Using the notation ∇ i f i := ∂ f i ∂ x i , we state the following assumption for objective functions.
Assumption 1: The function f i is C 1 and convex, and ∇ i f i is Lipschitz with constant L i for all i ∈ I.
Assumption 1 allows for a broad class of functions to be used as objective functions, including any C 2 convex function on a compact, convex domain (cf. Assumption 2 below). Each agent's state is constrained to lie in a given set, which we express as x i ∈ X i ⊂ R n i . Regarding each set X i , we state the following assumption.
Assumption 2: Each set X i is nonempty, compact, and convex.
In particular, Assumption 2 admits box constraints that are common in some multiagent problems. Now define the ensemble state vector
We impose global inequality constraints on the agents by requiring
where the above inequality is enforced component-wise, that is, g j (x) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ J := {1, . . . , m}. We now state our assumptions on g. Assumption 3: The function g j : R n → R is C 1 and convex for all j ∈ J. In addition, for R m and R n both equipped with the same p-norm, the function g x j := ∂ g ∂ x j is Lipschitz continuous with constant K j p , for all j ∈ J, with respect to the metric induced by the p-norm. The function g is Lipschitz with constant K g p with respect to the same metric. In this paper, we focus on the cases of p = 1 and p = 2 because the privacy mechanisms we use require computations of the 1-norm and 2-norm sensitivities of the systems of interest, and we, therefore, require Lipschitz constants with respect to metrics induced by these norms. Like Assumption 1, Assumption 3 allows for any convex, C 2 functions to be used for constraints whenever Assumption 2 holds. We also have the following assumption on g.
Assumption 4: The constraints satisfy Slater's condition, namely, there exists a pointx ∈ X such that g(x) < 0.
Assumption 4 is commonly enforced in nonlinear programming problems to guarantee that strong duality holds. Under Assumptions 1-4, we state an ensemble-level optimization problem. To do so, we define the ensemble objective
where the product is meant in the Cartesian sense. To fix ideas, we state the following optimization problem that does not yet incorporate privacy; privacy will be formally included in Problem 1 in Section III. Problem 0.1: (Preliminary; no privacy requirement)
♦ We note here that Problem 0.1 will be solved without having agent i share f i or X i with the other agents or with the cloud because these data are considered sensitive information. Similarly, g is considered sensitive and the cloud does not share g or any g x i with any of the agents. Problems of the form of Problem 0.1 have been applied across several multiagent applications, including communications [1] and sensor networks [30] . In these applications, objective functions can encode physical quantities such as individual channels' communication rates and the power consumed by wireless-sensor nodes, while constraints can enforce communication channels' capacity limits and can encode that packets must not be dropped.
The Lagrangian associated with Problem 0.1 is
where μ is a vector of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers in the nonnegative orthant of R m , denoted R m + . Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 a primal solutionx exists and the set of all primal solutions is nonempty and compact. With the addition of Assumption 4, a dual solutionμ exists and the optimal primal and dual values are equal [31, Prop. 6.4.3] .
Under Assumptions 1-4, a pointx solves Problem 0.1 if and only if there exists a pointμ ∈ R m
It is as saddle points of L that we seek solutions (x,μ) to Problem 0.1.
Toward that end, we next define the symbols
In what follows, it is necessary for G to be a Lipschitz mapping.
Though the maps f x and g x are Lipschitz by Assumptions 1 and 3, G itself cannot be shown to be Lipschitz because its domain, X × R m + , is unbounded by virtue of R m + being unbounded. To rectify this situation, we find a nonempty, convex, compact set containingμ as was done in [32] . By the saddle point condition
forx the Slater point as defined in Assumption 4. By the complementary slackness
We then define the set
which is nonempty, compact, and convex, by definition, and which containsμ. For economy of notation, we define the symbols Z := X × M andẑ := (x,μ), and we will use z := (x, μ) to denote an arbitrary point in Z. Below, we use the notions of monotonicity and strong monotonicity for operators, which we define now.
♦ By definition, every strongly monotone map is also monotone. We will use the notation V I(K, F ) to denote the generic problem of finding a point x ∈ K such that, for a monotone map F , y − x, F (x) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ K, and we will use the notation SOL(K, F ) to denote the solution set of V I(K, F ). Symbols Z and G refer to the specific problem under consideration in this paper so that Problem 0.2 is denoted as V I(Z, G) and its solution set is SOL(Z, G). It is in the setting of variational inequalities that we will proceed and we focus on solving Problem 0.2 with the understanding that its solutions also solve Problem 0.1.
For a compact set K and a monotone map F , one method of solving the variational inequality V I(K, F ) is using a projection method with an iterative Tikhonov regularization, as was done for deterministic variational inequalities in [36] and for stochastic variational inequalities in [37] ; these methods regularize the earlier Goldstein-Levitin-Polyak method for solving such problems [38] , [39] . The basic principle underlying these methods is that a point in SOL(K, F ) can be approached iteratively with F specifying the direction in which to move at each iteration. To endow this procedure with greater numerical stability and, as will be shown, robustness to noise, the kth iteration specified in [36] and [37] instead uses the direction specified by F + α k I with I the identity map, α k > 0, and
Given an initial point z(0) ∈ Z, the deterministic form of the regularized method to solve V I(Z, G) is given below in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Given a point z(0) ∈ Z, apply the update
Here, α k is the regularization parameter at timestep k and γ k is the step size at the same timestep. In Section III, we will use Algorithm 1 to solve a private optimization problem, and in Section IV, we provide hypotheses on γ k and α k sufficient for convergence. Currently, we show the applicability of this style of solution to the cloud architecture mentioned before.
B. Communications
If we separate the update law in Algorithm 1 to examine the per-agent (primal) update law, we find that agent i executes
The only terms on the right-hand side of this update law that contain information from other agents are g x i (x(k)) and μ(k).
Though g x i is a function of all states in the network, the agents do not send their states to each other directly to allow for its computation because doing so may reveal sensitive information. Instead, every agent sends its state to a trusted cloud computer that computes g x i (x(k)) for every i ∈ I. Because no agent has every agent's state value, no agent can compute μ(k) [cf.
(1)] and, therefore, the cloud computes μ(k) as well using the update law
Then, to use Algorithm 1 with this architecture, the cloud sends a private form of g x i (x(k)) T μ(k) to agent i; the modifications to these quantities to make them private are covered in Section III. The cloud is assumed to be a powerful computer capable of carrying out these calculations quickly so that they reliably arrive at the agents in a timely fashion. With this communications scheme, at timestep k, four actions occur. First, agent i sends x i (k) to the cloud and the cloud assembles all agents' states into the vector x(k). Second, the cloud computes μ(k) and g x i (x(k)) for all i ∈ I in a differentially private way. Third, the cloud sends a private form of g x i (x(k)) T μ(k) to agent i. Fourth, agent i computes x i (k + 1) while the cloud simultaneously computes μ(k + 1), and then this sequence of communications and computations is repeated. Because this happens at every timestep, information in the network is always synchronized when computations occur and there is no disagreement between the agents or cloud as to what the value of a particular state is. As a result, the computations that are spread across the network in this manner produce identical results to Algorithm 1, and the ensemble problem is, mathematically, equivalent to the cloud-based multiagent problem.
For simplicity, the forthcoming analysis will be carried out in the ensemble setting. Despite the mathematical equivalence between the multiagent and ensemble approaches, the advantage of the cloud-based approach in practice is that it allows for each agent's state trajectory to be kept private while the ensemble approach does not.
III. PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION
Differential privacy originates in the database literature in computer science and was originally designed to keep individual entries of a database private [18] . It has recently been extended to the setting of dynamical systems in [19] . Differential privacy offers a formal definition of privacy, as well as resilience to postprocessing and robustness to side information. This resilience to postprocessing prevents an adversary from weakening the guarantees of differential privacy by performing post-hoc calculations on private information. Robustness to side information guarantees that an adversary cannot use information it has gleaned from an alternate source to fully defeat differential privacy. Below, we first review differential privacy, then give a formal private optimization problem statement, and finally discuss applying privacy to Problem 0.2.
A. Differentially Private Systems
Let there be N input signals to a system, each contributed by some user. The ith input signal is denoted by u i and is contained in the set˜ s i p i , namely, the space of sequences of s ivectors equipped with the p i norm, with s i , p i ∈ N, such that every finite truncation of u i is in s i p i . More explicitly, let u i (k) denote the kth element of u i and define
Then, we say u i ∈˜ s i p i if and only if P T u i has finite p i -norm for all values of T . Using this definition, the full input space to the system is˜ s p =˜ s 1 p 1 × · · · ×˜ s N p N and the system produces outputs y ∈˜ r q . In this paper, we consider the cases where p i = 1 for all i ∈ I or p i = 2 for all i ∈ I. In the case of p i = 1, the full input space to the system is˜ s 1 and we use the ordinary 1-norm on this space. For p i = 2, we likewise use the ordinary 2-norm on˜ s 2 . While each of · 1 and · 2 will be used for both the 1-norm and 2-norm on R n and s p , the intent of each symbol can be discerned from its argument each time it is used.
To implement differential privacy, we must specify which inputs we wish to generate "similar" outputs. To do this, fix a real number B > 0 and define the binary symmetric adjacency
Two inputs u andũ for which Adj(u,ũ) = 1 are called "adjacent." In the case of smart grids discussed in the introduction, this adjacency relation can be used to capture private events such as a homeowner leaving his or her home for some period of time, for example, to go on vacation. During that time, their power usage would be very low for some period before returning to normal levels. It can also capture events in which a home has additional occupants for some period of time, as in a social gathering, which causes power levels to increase temporarily. These events and others are modeled by this definition of adjacency and can, therefore, be made private in this framework. Toward making precise the notion of "similar" outputs, fix a probability space (Ω, F, P ) and let B d denote the Borel σalgebra on R d . Differential privacy is enforced by a mechanism, which is a map M taking the form M :˜ s p × Ω →˜ r q and the role of a mechanism is to approximate the outputs of a system whose inputs are sensitive information. We now state the definition of a differentially private mechanism. In this definition, we use a σ-algebra over˜ r q , denoted as Σ q,r . 1 Definition 2: A mechanism M :˜ s p × Ω →˜ r q is ( , δ)differentially private if and only if, for all adjacent u,ũ ∈˜ s p P (M (u) ∈ S) ≤ e P (M (ũ) ∈ S) + δ for all S ∈ Σ q,r . ♦ In Definition 2, it is and δ that determine the privacy policy, and smaller values of each imply a greater level of privacy for users. In general, should be kept small and typical values for range from 0.1 to ln 3. On the other hand, δ should be kept as small as possible because it allows for zero probability events for M (ũ) to have nonzero probability for M (u), and, therefore, can allow for important losses in privacy by making it easy for an adversary to distinguish between outputs. Common values for δ range from 0 to 0.05; ( , 0)-differential privacy is called -differential privacy and, in general, -differential privacy is stronger than ( , δ)-differential privacy precisely because of the aforementioned losses in privacy that can come from δ > 0.
B. Private Optimization Problem Statement
In the setting of Problem 0.2, we want to protect the state trajectory, x = (x(k)) k ∈N , which is a sensitive signal in˜ s p , and in doing so, we protect each individual agent's state trajectory; for agent i, this is x i ∈˜ s i p i . As discussed in Section II, keeping individual agents' state trajectories private is necessary when the cloud computes g x i and μ at each time k. To implement privacy in these computations, we regard each g x i as a deterministic, causal, memoryless dynamical system, and seek to make each such system differentially private. Similarly, we regard g as a deterministic, causal, memoryless dynamical system, and seek to make it differentially private as well. Due to the postprocessing property of differential privacy, computing μ using a private form of g also implies that μ keeps each x i private.
As discussed in Section II, the agents do not communicate with each other at all and, instead, each agent only sends its state to the cloud. The cloud handles all required centralized computations and sends (privatized forms of) their results to the agents. Letḡ x i denote the private form of g x i , letḡ denote the private form of g, and letμ denote a dual vector μ that has been computed usingḡ instead of g.
At time k, the cloud sends to agent i the vector
We are interested in having a team of agents optimize by having the cloud send agent i onlyp i (k) at time k. We require that p i (k) protect x i for all i ∈ I, and we implement privacy by approximating g x i (for all i ∈ I) and g by differentially private mechanisms. Using this method of communications, we state the following problem that incorporates both optimization and privacy objectives, and respects the fact that the objectives and constraints in this problem are sensitive data. Problem 1: (Private optimization ) Solve Problem 0.2 using Algorithm 1 while i) the agents communicate only with the cloud (i.e., there is no inter-agent communication); ii) the cloud makes the systems g and g x i , i ∈ I (whose inputs are the agents' state trajectories) differentially private in the sense of Definition 2; iii) agent i does not share f i or X i with any other agent or the cloud; iv) the cloud does not share g or any g x i with any agent. ♦ Points iii) and iv) in Problem 1 are required because f i , X i , g x i , and g are considered sensitive information. These data could also be useful to an adversary attempting to infer agents' states using the system dynamics, and it is beneficial not to share these problem data for precisely this reason. Toward solving Problem 1, we now review mechanisms that implement differential privacy for dynamical systems.
C. Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
To define a mechanism for enforcing differential privacy, we must first also define the sensitivity of a system, which is used to determine the variance of noise that must be added in a privacypreserving mechanism. Letting G be a deterministic causal system, the sensitivity of G is an upper bound on the distance between G(u) and G(ũ) whenever Adj B (u,ũ) = 1 holds. Formally, we define the p sensitivity of G, denoted by Δ p G, as
The mechanism we will use for -differential privacy is the Laplace mechanism, which adds noise drawn from a Laplace distribution. Below, we use the notation Lap(μ, b) to denote the Laplace distribution with mean μ and scale parameter b.
Theorem 1: ([19, Th. 4]) Let the adjacency relation defined in (3) be used with p = 1 and let G be a system with sensitivity Δ 1 G. Let a constant ≥ 0 be given and recall that r is the dimension of the output space. Then, the mechanism
For ( , δ)-differential privacy, we will use the Gaussian mechanism. Its definition requires that we first define κ(δ, ) using the Q-function
The function κ(δ, ) is defined for ≥ 0 and 0 < δ < 1 2 as κ(δ, ) :
We now define the Gaussian mechanism. Theorem 2: ([19, Th. 3]) Let the adjacency relation in (3) be used with p = 2 and let G be a system with sensitivity Δ 2 G, with constants ≥ 0 and 0 < δ < 1 2 given and r the dimension of the output space. Then, the mechanism M (x) = G(
Theorems 1 and 2 provide a lower bound on the variance of each noise that is added and we assume that these variances are also chosen to be finite. We now compute the sensitivities that are needed to implement differential privacy in Problem 1.
D. Computing Sensitivities
In Problem 1, protecting the value of x, including from agents in the network, is desied. In the per-agent update law in (2), x(k) appears in g x i , and g x i must, therefore, be made private when the cloud computes g x i (x(k)). To protect x in this way, the cloud adds noise directly to g x i (x(k)), and the variance of noise that must be added depends on the sensitivity of g x i . To compute the sensitivity of g x i , we regard it as a memoryless dynamical system and generalize it to act on entire signals of states. Recalling that x(k) ∈ X for all k, Assumption 2 provides that X is bounded and, therefore, x(k) is as well for all k ∈ N.
Then, x ∈˜ n p . We now overload the notation g x i by allowing it to act on elements of˜ n p . In particular, g x i acts on elements of R n as before and for state trajectories x ∈˜ n p , we define
We now fix a real scalar B > 0. For two state trajectories, x,x ∈˜ n p such that Adj B (x,x) = 1 holds, we compute the sensitivity of g x i according to
where we have used x −x p ≤ B and where this bound on the sensitivity holds for g x i for all i ∈ I. In computing μ(k), the cloud must also add noise in some fashion because μ(k) depends upon x(k). We regard g as a dynamical system and make it private, and the resilience of differential privacy to postprocessing guarantees that μ = (μ(k)) k ∈N keeps x private. To compute the sensitivity of g, we extend it to act on x ∈˜ n p as before. For x,x ∈˜ n p satisfying Adj B (x,x) = 1, we use the same procedure as was used above for g x i to find
Having computed the requisite sensitivities, we return to solving Problem 1.
E. Optimizing in the Presence of Noise
We now examine how noise appears in Algorithm 1 once it has been added for privacy. For g x i (x(k)), we add noise w i (k) ∈ R m ×n i drawn from either a Laplace or Gaussian distribution and for g(x(k)), we add noise w g (k) ∈ R m drawn from the same class of distribution as the w i , with all noises independent. Define w x by w x = (w 1 w 2 · · · w n ) ∈ R m ×n .
In ensemble form, the private dynamics under consideration are
Expanding, we find
is some weighted combination of elements of w x (k) with non-negative weights. Combined with the independence of the noises used for privacy, this results in each entry of w x (k) T μ(k) being a random variable having variance that is the weighted sum of variances of elements of w x (k). With this in mind, we define the random vector w s (k) = w x (k) T μ(k) (which we note has finite variance since μ(k) is contained in M and w x (k) has finite variance), and zero mean (because w i (k) has zero mean for all k ∈ N and all i ∈ I). Then, we find
where w(k) denotes the noise added at timestep k and aggregates all noisy signals used for privacy. We state this stochastic update law as Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2: Given z(0) ∈ Z, apply the update law
until a fixed pointẑ ∈ Z is reached. ♦ We note that by its definition E[w(k)] = 0, and observe that this noisy update law is equivalent to Algorithm 1 with an additional noise term added. As discussed above, Algorithm 2 allows the agents to optimize without requiring that agent i share f i or X i with any other agents or the cloud. In addition, as will be shown in Section IV, Algorithm 2 tolerates noise of constant variance, as required by differential privacy, while still allowing for convergence in mean-square. The convergence of Algorithm 2 is the subject of the next section.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we prove the convergence of Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 was first presented in [36] without noise and was presented in its noisy form in [37] . Both papers omit proofs and, due to the heavy dependence of this paper upon Algorithm 2, we provide a proof here. To the best of our knowledge, a proof of the convergence of Algorithm 2, as stated in [37] , is not available in the literature; similar work is presented in [40] and [41] that cover algorithms related to Algorithm 2, though those works impose additional assumptions upon α k and γ k due to the differences in the problems studied there.
A. Main Convergence Result
Now, we explore in depth solving variational inequalities using a Tikhonov regularized projection method, the basic elements of which are covered in [35, Sec. 12.2] . Earlier, it was stated that if SOL(K, F ) = ∅, then for ξ k ∈ SOL(K, F + α k I), we have ξ k → z 0 , where z 0 is the least-norm element of SOL(K, F ). Using that {ξ k } k ∈N is a convergent sequence, we find that { ξ k } k ∈N is bounded and, in particular, there is some M ξ such that ξ k ≤ M ξ for all k, for example, ξ k ≤ sup z ∈Z z . Using this fact, the following lemma relates points z(k) generated by Algorithm 2 to successive solutions to the problems V I(Z, G + α k I) (each with α k held constant). Recalling that ξ k is the unique solution to V I(Z, G + α k I), we have the following result.
Proof: See the Appendix. The other lemma we need concerns the convergence of sequences of random variables and enables a Lyapunov-like argument to be made for their convergence.
Lemma 2: ([42] , Lemma 10, p. 49) Let v 0 , . . . , v k be a sequence of independent random variables with v k ≥ 0 and
Then, E[v k ] → 0. If, in addition, we have ∞ k =0 σ k < ∞, then v k → 0 almost surely and, for all η > 0
We now prove the convergence of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3: Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Suppose that γ k > 0 and α k > 0 satisfy the following four conditions:
Then for noise signal w with E[w(k)] = 0 and bounded variance for all k ∈ N, for the update rule
Let L G be the Lipschitz constant of G. If, in addition to the above, the sequence of terms
is summable, then z(k) − z 0 2 → 0 and the convergence estimate
holds for all η > 0. Proof: It was established in Section II-A that SOL(Z, G) = ∅ so that ξ k → z 0 , where z 0 is the least-norm element of SOL(Z, G) and where ξ k solves V I(Z, G + α k I). We now show that z(k + 1) → ξ k .
Because ξ k solves V I(Z, G + α k I), we have
Using the nonexpansive property of the projection operator and taking the expectation of both sides, we find
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of G, and where the fact that E[w(k)] = 0 has caused all terms containing w(k) except E[ w(k) 2 ] to vanish.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, then gives
. Assumptions 1-3 and the compactness of M imply that G is Lipschitz with some constant L G . We then have
Defining
applying Lemma 1 then gives
By hypothesis, we have
with α k > 0 and γ k > 0 for all k. Then, there exists an M > 0 such that for all k ≥ M , we have γ k α k ∈ (0, 1) and
Then, for all k ≥ M , θ k (1 + γ k α k ) ≤ θ k + γ k α k and, thus, for all k ≥ M
In particular, take some θ ∈ (0, 1) so that
All that remains is to show that the conditions of Lemma 2 are met. First, τ k ∈ (0, 1) by construction. For all k ≥ M , we have ρ k ≥ 0 and θ k ≥ 0 so that σ k ≥ 0. Regarding summability of τ k , we find ∞ k =M τ k = θ ∞ k =M γ k α k = ∞ by hypothesis. To show that σ k /τ k → 0, we have
Using the hypotheses regarding γ k and α k , we have
2 → 0, so that the first term in σ k τ k goes to zero. It was established in Section III-E that E[ w(k) 2 ] is bounded above for all k, namely, that E[ w(k) 2 ] ≤ K w for some K w > 0. Because γ k α k → 0, we have γ k α k K w → 0 and, hence, σ k τ k → 0 as desired, and the first part of the theorem follows from Lemma 2.
If the sequence {σ k } k ∈N is summable, the additional convergence result is a straightforward application of Lemma 2 as well.
One valid choice of γ k and α k in Theorem 3 is α =ᾱk −c 1 and γ =γk −c 2 , withᾱ > 0,γ > 0, 0 < c 1 < c 2 , and c 1 + c 2 < 1 [37] .
B. Convergence Rate Estimates
For the aforementioned choice of step size, we derive bounds on c 1 and c 2 that are sufficient to make σ k summable. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3, there exists an M > 0 such that for all k ≥ M , we have θ k ∈ (0, 1), so that for all k ≥ M , we have
To make the second term in (7) summable, we can set γ k =γk −c 2 with c 2 > 1 2 . Again, using K w to denote an upper bound on the variance of w(k) gives
where ζ(·) is the Riemann zeta function [43] , defined as ζ(p) = ∞ n =1 1 n p , which takes finite values for real arguments p > 1.
Regarding the first term in (7), we note that there is somê M > 0 such that
for all k ≥M and therefore
for all such k. Substituting α k =ᾱk −c 1 and expanding the squared term gives
.
To approximate the terms containing 1/k, we use a (truncated) power series expansion, namely, that for x ∈ (−1, 1)
(1 − x) −r ≈ 1 + rx + 1 2 r(r + 1)x 2 + 1 6 r(r + 1)(r + 2)x 3 .
(10) Applying (10) to (9) gives
We see that sums of such terms are given by
Returning to (7) and using the results of (8) and (11) gives
Due to the approximations made and ranges of k considered in bounding this sum, we can only guarantee that the convergence estimate relying on ∞ k =1 σ k will hold for k ≥ max{M,M }. However, for k ≤ M , we will often have σ k < 0 (as when L G is large) and, thus, we expect the bound in (12) to hold for a range of values of k ≤ M because negative terms with such indices have been overestimated by including positive terms at such indices in (12) . In addition, we expectᾱ andγ to be small enough thatM will often be small, allowing this bound to hold over a wide range of values of k.
To apply the bound in (4), we also need to estimate the term
Returning to (6) and taking the expectation of both sides, one timestep earlier gives
which is a time-varying affine recurrence relation in the expected error in Algorithm 2. Solving (13) (see, for example, [44] , Sec. 2.1.1.2), we find that 
Proof: This follows from Theorem 3, (12) , and the fact that
One may, of course, wonder how the scale of a problem affects the convergence of Algorithm 2. This point can be assessed by using Theorem 4. The expected error in Theorem 4 is affected by σ i , which, in turn, depends upon L G , the Lipschitz constant of the operator G. As one adds more constraints and per-agent objectives to a problem, certainly L G becomes larger, though the specific choices of objectives and constraints can dramatically impact how L G changes as a problem is scaled up. Thus, the issue of scalability is largely dependent upon the functions used in a problem and their Lipschitz constants, with higher Lipschitz constants generally slowing convergence more. In addition, the choices of γ k and α k can help limit the changes in σ k in response to growth in L G , letting users improve scalability through judicious choices of parameters.
Having explored convergence in the presence of privacy, we now examine the tradeoff between the two competing objectives of privacy and convergence.
C. Tradeoff Between Privacy and Convergence
In this section, we derive a quantifiable tradeoff between privacy and convergence, and for concreteness, we focus on the case of -differential privacy, though a similar tradeoff can be derived for ( , δ)-differential privacy.
Returning to (5) , we find the inequality
where we see that only the term E[ w(k) 2 ] depends upon the noise added for privacy. Given that w(k) has zero mean, we find
In the case of -differential privacy,
is a constant that depends upon the systems of interest, g and g x i , and the adjacency parameter, B. Returning to (14) and substituting in var[w(k)] = W 2 , we find
The additive term γ 2 k W 2 is the only term in which the privacy parameter appears, and this term can be regarded as a penalty on convergence because it allows the expected error E[ z(k + 1) − ξ k 2 ] to grow from z(k) − ξ k −1 2 . Viewing this term as a convergence penalty then reveals a fundamental tradeoff between privacy and convergence: Implementing -differential privacy comes at the cost of a convergence penalty proportional to 1/ 2 . We state this tradeoff succinctly and informally by writing Privacy( ) ⇐⇒ Convergence( −2 ).
One can also see the effects of removing privacy in Algorithm 2 in (15) . There eliminating privacy corresponds to W = 0 which, in turn, removes the term γ 2 k W 2 . Thus, the introduction of privacy into Algorithm 1 introduces a convergence error of the form γ 2 k W 2 at time k.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Below, we present numerical simulation results for a system with n = 10 agents and m = 6 constraints. We simulate both -and ( , δ)-differential privacy, and to illustrate the effects of privacy upon convergence, we also provide simulation results for problems without privacy.
A. Example Problem
Let there be n = 10 agents, each with state x i ∈ R 2 and using ensemble objective function 
Each agent was also constrained to lie in the box X i = [−10, 10] × [−10, 10]. The Lipschitz constants of g were computed to be K g 1 = 39.82 and K g 2 = 56.71. The Lipschitz constants for each g x i are shown in Table I .
In both simulation runs below, the step-size rule discussed at the end of Section IV was used with the values α = 0.1,γ = 0.01, c 1 = 0.3, and c 2 = 0.52 and all states and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers were initialized to zero, that is, x i (0) = 0 for all i ∈ I and μ(0) = 0.
B. Simulation of -Differential Privacy
For this simulation, the adjacency parameter was chosen to be B = 1. The value = ln 2 was used for all systems. The distribution and variance of each entry of each noisy signal were computed and are listed in Table II where we use the notation for the PDF of a random scalar with the understanding that each entry of the random matrices w i was generated using this distribution. The distribution for w g was Lap(0, 57.45) with variance 6.600 · 10 3 . Using this problem formulation, Algorithm 2 was run for 1 00 000 iterations. To show the behavior of the algorithm over time, the least-norm saddle point of L, z 0 = (x 0 , μ 0 ) was computed ahead of time and the values of x(k) − x 0 2 and μ(k) − μ 0 2 are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 , respectively, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 00 000. 2 To visually demonstrate the impact of privacy upon convergence, the values of x(k) − x 0 2 and μ(k) − μ 0 2 are also shown in Figs. 1 and 2 , respectively. In Figs. 1 and 2 , we see a clear decreasing trend in both x(k) − x 0 2 and μ(k) − μ 0 2 , with the primal error appearing to be monotonically decreasing and the dual error oscillating while showing a general decreasing trend. In both plots, we see that the error curves for the private simulation generally closely match those of the nonprivate simulation, indicating that incorporating -differential privacy does not substantially harm convergence. The oscillations seen are expected given that the variance of the noises added is constant while G decreases in magnitude as the saddle point z 0 is approached. In fact, it is known that descent will be achieved in a gradient method as long as the norm of noise added to the gradient is less than the norm of the gradient itself [45] . In light of this fact, the trends seen in Figs. 1 and 2 are not surprising because the gradients in G in Algorithm 2 will have large norms far from z 0 , thereby allowing them to "overpower" the noise added, while Values of μ(k) − μ 0 2 generated by Algorithm 2 withdifferential privacy (upper, solid curve) and without privacy (lower, dashed curve) for k = 1, . . . , 1 00 000. Here we see an initial descent followed by a period of oscillations as μ(k) approaches μ 0 . close to z 0 their norms will be smaller and the noise can dominate, causing increases in the distance to z 0 at some timesteps. Of course, z(k) → z 0 asymptotically because these increases in z(k) − z 0 2 average out over long periods of time.
The initial error values here were These values confirm what can be seen visually in Figs. 1 and 2: Shorter runtimes than 1 00 000 timesteps can be used while ending at a reasonable distance from z 0 and, in light of the large variances of some noises present, reasonable numbers of iterations produce an approach toward z 0 that would be useful in many applications.
C. Simulation of ( , δ)-Differential Privacy
In this simulation, the adjacency parameter was chosen to be B = 1. The values = ln 2 and δ = 0.01 were used for all systems, giving κ(δ, ) = 3.559. Using this privacy policy, the distribution and variance of each noisy signal were computed and are listed in Table III. The distribution for w g was N (0 6×1 , 4.073 · 10 4 I 6×6 ) with variance 4.073 · 10 4 . In Table III , we record the distribution of each entry of the matrices w i , i ∈ I, with the understanding that each w i has independent identically distributed entries. Using this problem formulation, Algorithm 2 was run for 1 00 000 iterations and the values of x(k) − x 0 2 and μ(k) − μ 0 2 for 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 00 000 are plotted in Figs. 3 and 4 , respectively, in the upper, solid curves. To highlight the impact of privacy upon convergence, this problem was also run without privacy, and the resulting error curves are shown in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively, in the lower, dashed curves. In Figs. 3 and 4 , we see a similar trend to Figs. 1 and 2: nearly monotone decreases in the primal error, and general decreases in the dual error with noticeable oscillations present. In this case, we see that both the primal and dual errors are generally larger than in the simulation in Section V-B, and this is not surprising because the variances of noisy terms in this simulation are generally larger than in the one performed there. In particular, the variance of noise added in the dual update is nearly an order of magnitude larger than that added in Section V-B. Nonetheless, examining numerical error values for this simulation run reveals that solutions close to the optimum can be attained across reasonable time horizons.
The initial error values for this run were while after half of the total timesteps taken, these values were
x(50, 000) − x 0 2 = 1.7857 and μ(50, 000) − μ 0 2 = 0.2500 Fig. 4 . Values of μ(k) − μ 0 2 for k = 1, . . . , 1 00 000 under ( , δ)differential privacy with Algorithm 2 (upper, solid curve), and values of μ(k) − μ 0 2 across the same range of k without privacy (lower, dashed curve). The initial approach of the solid curve toward μ 0 and subsequent oscillations indicate numerical convergence to μ 0 when noise is added for differential privacy.
indicating a rapid initial descent toward z 0 and close proximity to it thereafter.
Both simulation examples show a rapid decrease in the distance from z(k) to z 0 . Such a rapid decrease lends itself to use of this algorithm in practical applications because it allows for useful improvements to be made in the value of f in a reasonable runtime while respecting the set and functional constraints of the problem. The theoretical and simulation results presented here demonstrate the utility of the iterative Tikhonov regularization, even in the presence of noise with large variance. This robustness is further supported by the simulation results in [29] and demonstrates that, in a practical setting, strong, quantifiable guarantees of privacy can be achieved while providing useful convergence guarantees in the optimization problem of interest. Critical to the success of these numerical results is all noise being zero mean, and it is a feature of differential privacy that zero mean noise is effective at protecting sensitive information.
VI. CONCLUSION
A differentially private optimization algorithm for teams of many agents coordinated by a central cloud computer was presented. This problem was treated as a stochastic variational inequality and solved using a Tikhonov-regularized Goldstein-Levitin-Polyak iteration. Its convergence was shown for both -and ( , δ)-differential privacy, and numerical convergence of the algorithm was shown in simulation, demonstrating the ability to arrive at a collective decision while maintaining privacy for the users involved in making it.
APPENDIX

Proof of Lemma 1:
First note that because ξ k solves V I(K, G + α k I), we have
Similarly for ξ k −1 , we find
